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provisions, which form the cornerstone of the development dimension at WTO and 
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Introduction 
he main objective of the rules of the World Trade Organization is the 
liberalization of international exchanges. These rules are based on the non-
discrimination principle, which has two manifestations: Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
Treatment, and National Treatment. The first of these is the cornerstone of the WTO 
system; however, its application to relationships between states with different degrees 
of development has been much criticized.
1  
Almost three-quarters of the members of the WTO are developing countries. This 
fact is taken into account by both the organization itself and its members; 
consequently, from the very beginning of the multilateral trade system differences in 
degree of development have had a significant impact on WTO rules. The aim of this 
work is to analyze the current situation and the possible evolution of the Special and 
Differential Treatment provisions in WTO rules.   
II. Special and Differential Treatment 
n important component of the development dimension of the WTO has been the 
concept of Special and Differential Treatment, but the concept is a result of the 
Uruguay Round and is thus quite young. Previous to the Uruguay Round, exceptional 
treatment provided to developing countries was called Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, and its content was different in nature to that of Special and 
Differential Treatment. Thus, while Differential and More Favourable Treatment in 
GATT 1947 was a development tool, in the WTO development is a secondary aim: it 
is understood that the first step toward development is the adjustment to WTO rules, 
and Special and Differential Treatment is one of the main tools of this adjustment. The 
reasons for this change can be found in the modification of the rules’ objective: the 
goal of GATT 1947 was development, while for the WTO the first aspiration is 
adjustment to multilateral system law. 
a. Differential and More Favourable Treatment 
Obviously, Differential and More Favourable Treatment implies a beneficial 
treatment,
2 the aim of which is to improve the economic situation of developing 
countries. This treatment is considered a development tool
3 whose objective is to assist 
developing countries in order to provide them with the chance to overcome their 
economic and social vulnerability. 
The most important expression of More Favourable Treatment is Preferential 
Treatment and, more specifically, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Thus, 
More Favourable Treatment consists in granting specific rights in order to protect 
T 
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markets and to facilitate access to the markets of other country members.
4 In other 
words, More Favourable Treatment has two manifestations: 
Ad intra manifestation: developing countries are allowed to restrict access to their 
markets in the case of balance-of-payments problems that affect their industry, as well 
as to manage their tariffs with more flexibility.  
Ad extra manifestation: developing countries’ products enjoy easier access to 
markets of both developed countries (GSP) and other developing countries (South-
South preferences). 
b. Special and Differential Treatment 
The replacement of the term More Favourable with the term Special is significant, 
and it is important to define what Special and Differential Treatment is. The WTO 
does not define Special; nor does it define Differential, nor More Favourable.
5 
According to the evolution of these provisions at the WTO, Special and Differential 
Treatment can be defined as the legal verification of the economic differences between 
developed-country and developing-country members. 
Special and Differential Treatment can be distinguished from Differential and 
More Favourable Treatment in that the former does not provide developing countries 
with any kind of specific protection; rather, it merely regulates the adjustment of 
developing countries to WTO rules. As Tortora notes, Special and Differential 
Treatment is an adjustment tool for developing countries, the aim of which is to 
develop the capacity of their domestic legal frameworks to accommodate global trade 
rules. From the point of view of Uruguay Round negotiators, this adjustment “will 
automatically be beneficial for their development. In other words, more than aiming at 
developing a local productive capacity, the existing WTO [Special and Differential 
Treatment] measures aim at developing legal and institutional frameworks that suit the 
agreed trade obligations.”
6 
The reason developing countries accepted this normative change is that they 
“entered the Uruguay Round negotiations advocating less emphasis on non-reciprocity 
with the negotiating objective of accepting a dilution of [Special and Differential 
Treatment] in exchange for better market access and strengthened rules. Notably, they 
did not seek exemption from the multilateral trade agreements, accepting the ‘single 
undertaking’ approach of the Round.”
7 Indeed, “developing countries were convinced 
that they could gain more benefits from the multilateral trading system, if developed 
countries abolished barriers to their trade, especially in the agricultural and textiles 
and clothing sectors. The perceived benefits of the [Special and Differential 
Treatment] provisions in the GATT pale into insignificance when compared to the 
potential benefits that could be gained from improved access for products of export   A. Manero-Salvador 
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interest to them, especially agricultural and textile and clothing products. Furthermore, 
developing countries became convinced that liberalization at the multilateral level 
under the auspices of the GATT was much more secure than the unilateral preferences 
that they were accustomed to receiving from developed countries.”
8  
Unfortunately, the Uruguay Round Agreements did not give the necessary impulse 
towards development. Instead, as Singh remarks, “it will be difficult to maintain that 
… several … elements of the Agreements normally have … a positive impact on 
economic development ….”
9 In other words, WTO rules clearly changed the way this 
treatment had been understood before the Uruguay Round; therefore, the reorientation 
embodied in the formulation of Special and Differential Treatment after the Uruguay 
Round, and the results of the multilateral negotiations, do not meet the developing 
countries’ expectations.
10 
In the WTO legal framework,
11 all Special and Differential Treatment provisions 
have two characteristics in common: distinction between developing and developed 
countries, and exception to another rule. Beyond these two commonalities, the 




• positive obligations to developed-country members,
13 
• positive obligations to developing countries,
14 




• provisions relating to least-developed-country members (LDCs).
17 
A great portion of the rules are difficult to implement due to the soft law character 
of most Special and Differential Treatment provisions. As Olivares notes, it “is 
paradoxical that while the entire GATT legal regime of ‘soft law’ rules has been 
upgraded to ‘hard law’ status, by virtue of the creation of a legally enforceable 
mechanism, … the set of GATT soft legal provisions granting benefits to developing 
countries and LDCs has not been upgraded.”
18 Most Special and Differential 
Treatment provisions are best endeavour clauses that do not specify rights and 
obligations clearly. This situation creates important difficulties in putting into practice 
Special and Differential Treatment provisions and in bringing claims forward for   
dispute settlement.
19 Furthermore, Special and Differential Treatment provisions are 
frequently not adapted to the needs of developing countries and LDCs. For instance, 
the transitional periods establish timeframes for developing-country members to adapt 
their domestic legal frameworks to WTO rules, but it is unlikely that a developing-  A. Manero-Salvador 
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country member will have been able to overcome its development problems by the 
time a transitional period ends.
20  
In spite of the flexibility and the more permissive treatment that Special and 
Differential Treatment provisions give to LDCs – see The Decision on Measures in 
Favour of Least Developed Countries and Article XI.2 of the Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization
21 – their needs are not adequately reflected in WTO 
rules. LDCs are marginalized in world trade, and WTO rules do not provide the legal 
framework required to improve their participation and to enjoy its benefits. Certainly, 
“there is an urgent need for positive actions in the areas of both market access and 
technical assistance in the context of the next trade round. Without such actions 
[Special and Differential Treatment] would be hardly relevant for the trade 
development of LDCs.”
22 
Finally, the influence of Differential and More Favourable Treatment instruments 
in the WTO has decreased significantly
23 due to the erosion of preferential tariff 
margins under non-reciprocal preferences; this erosion is the result of two observable 
facts:  
• the tariff reductions were extended by the application of the MFN clause, and 
• regional trade agreements, which offer a deeper integration, have 
proliferated.
24  
Fundamental to the Doha Round is the need to address these deficiencies of both 
Differential and More Favourable Treatment and the Special and Differential 
Treatment provisions.
25  
III. Special and Differential Treatment in the Doha 
Round 
ne of the main objectives of the Doha Round, also known as the Development 
Round, is to promote the development of developing and LDC members. One of 
the most problematic issues of its mandate is the negotiations on Special and 
Differential Treatment.  
As the Doha Ministerial Declaration and the Implementation-related Issues and 
Concerns Decision say, Special and Differential Treatment is an “inherent key aspect 
of the GATT/WTO framework”,
26 but these provisions have many deficiencies to be 
addressed in the multilateral negotiations. To serve Doha’s mandate – review Special 
and Differential Treatment provisions with a view to strengthening them and making 
them more precise, effective and operational – the Ministerial Conference established 
three stages: 
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1. identify mandatory and non-mandatory Special and Differential Treatment 
provisions; 
2. examine the use of the provisions; 
3. incorporate the provisions into the WTO legal system. 
The first two stages were accomplished easily;
27 unfortunately, however, the third 
stage is more complicated because of the divergent positions of developing-country 
and developed-country members. 
The debate about incorporation of the Special and Differential Treatment 
provisions into the WTO legal system will be analyzed in two steps: the three basic 
elements of the Special and Differential Treatment negotiations are introduced in the 
next subsection; following that, the 88 agreement-specific proposals that have been 
tabled by developing-country members are briefly categorized.  
a. The Basic Elements of the Special and Differential 
Treatment Negotiations 
The Special and Differential Treatment negotiations have three basic elements: 
1. reinforcement of the Special and Differential Treatment provisions (Paragraph 44 of 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration); 
2. the monitoring mechanism; and 
3. the definition and classification of developing-country members and the graduation 
of Special and Differential Treatment. 
1. Reinforcing the Special and Differential Treatment provisions is probably one 
of the most problematic obstacles of the negotiations. From a legal perspective, there 
are two ways to implement this mandate: the amendment and the authoritative 
interpretation.  
The amendment procedure (article X of the WTO Agreement) could convert non-
mandatory Special and Differential Treatment provisions to mandatory ones. As the 
Secretariat says, “amendment of the relevant provisions would involve replacing the 
term ‘should’ with the term ‘shall’, while leaving the rest of the provisions 
unchanged.”
28 Unfortunately, developed-country members do not support this 
proposal.
29  
The authoritative interpretation (article IX.2 of WTO Agreement) cannot modify 
the text of the agreements, as its aim is not to substitute for the objective of the 
amendment procedure. But, as the Secretariat has noted, the Appellate Body suggested 
in the case Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft that “in some 
instances and depending on the context, a provision that used the word ‘should’ could 
imply a ‘duty’ rather than a mere ‘exhortation’.
30 It should be noted that the Appellate 
Body stated to this effect when interpreting a provision of a procedural nature.
31 If it   A. Manero-Salvador 
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were felt that one or other of the non-mandatory Special and Differential Treatment 
provisions which use the term ‘should’ implied a duty rather than exhortation, an 
authoritative interpretation could be used to confirm that the relevant provisions are, 
in fact, meant to be mandatory in nature.”
32   
Developed countries do not support either procedure for reinforcing the 
provisions. They argue that the “failure to use [Special and Differential Treatment] 
provisions does not necessarily mean there is a problem with their wording or that 
they are irrelevant. …. We should not be too hasty in assuming that they would be 
better served by changing them. To make efficient use of our resources in considering 
proposals to make provisions more effective, we might first assess if countries can 
make better use of existing provisions.”
33 
2. The monitoring mechanism is not as controversial as reinforcement of the 
Special and Differential Treatment provisions. Members agree on this proposal, but 
they differ in its modus operandi. For developed-country members, the monitoring 
mechanism should have three main functions: 
“(a) Enhancing integration and exchange among WTO bodies and committees, in 
effect, serving as a focal point for interaction and dissemination of information (for 
example, in the areas of technical assistance, training, and WTO programming). 
(b) Assessing implementation and utilization of Special and Differential 
Treatment provisions for purposes of furthering integration of Members into the WTO 
system by tracking the effective use of transitions and using bench-marks to tailor 
implementation plans to development needs and provide accountability.   
(c) Ensuring more effective and supportive relations with other international 
institutions, particularly the UNCTAD/WTO International Trade Centre and the 
international financial institutions.”
34  
However, from the point of view of developing-country members, the Special and 
Differential Treatment monitoring mechanism should have other kinds of 
competencies. As the African Group remarks, “the mechanism is to be established to 
undertake functions in relation to [Special and Differential] Treatment provisions that 
have undergone suitable changes after the exercise mandated by the Ministers, or new 
[Special and Differential] Treatment provisions that will be negotiated. In this regard, 
it is our firm understanding that the mandate to the Special Session of the [Committee 
on Trade and Development] cannot be passed down or taken over by the negotiating 
bodies. These bodies should negotiate new [Special and Differential] Treatment 
provisions in accordance with the ministerial instructions relating to the negotiations, 
while the [Committee on Trade and Development] completes the exercise of 
reviewing and strengthening the existing [Special and Differential] Treatment   A. Manero-Salvador 
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provisions, including an appropriate framework for including [Special and 
Differential] Treatment in the architecture of WTO Rules.” 
The three main functions of the monitoring mechanism, from the point of view of 
the African Group, should be 
“(a) a requirement that all WTO Committees keep [Special and Differential] 
Treatment as a standing agenda item for all their meetings, and that they produce 
regular reports on [Special and Differential] Treatment; 
(b) the establishment of a sub-committee on [Special and Differential] Treatment 
as a subsidiary organ working under and reporting to the [Committee on Trade and 
Development]; and 
(c) the holding of special annual sessions of the General Council and scheduling 
dedicated agenda items at the biennial sessions of the Ministerial Conference.”
35 
Currently, there is not a wide consensus about the functions and competencies of 
this new organ. If a monitoring mechanism is to be established, it is absolutely 
necessary to define clearly its modus operandi. Otherwise, this organ could reproduce 
the same functions and competencies in technical assistance that the Committee on 
Trade and Development or the WTO Secretariat have. Unfortunately, finding a 
consensus on this issue does not seem to be an easy task. 
3. The definition and classification of developing-country members and the 
graduation of Special and Differential Treatment are the main questions in the debate 
about the future of Special and Differential Treatment. There is no definition of 
developing country in WTO rules. Instead, the method used to classify WTO members 
as developing or developed countries is self-election. This method does not take into 
account the tremendous economic heterogeneity among developing-country members; 
the Doha Round’s mandate seems to be a good opportunity to define what a 
developing country is, as well as which developing countries should benefit from the 
new Special and Differential Treatment understanding. 
Switzerland based this proposal on the non-discrimination principle and on the 
ideological basis of Special and Differential Treatment, i.e., a different treatment 
should be provided to countries with different development levels: “The multilateral 
trading system is based upon the principle of non-discrimination. Yet, if common rules 
affect Members in substantially different ways, it might be necessary to modify the 
application of a rule or create a special rule in order not to discriminate against certain 
Members. Equal treatment of Members with fundamental differences of starting 
positions is not conducive to creating a competitive edge for and to fostering the trade 
interests of those – the poorest – who need it most. This is why developing countries, 
as a group, have been recognized in some GATT and WTO Agreements and   A. Manero-Salvador 
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Decisions. … For this reason, participants should reconsider and simplify the various 
existing and requested categories and agree on a transparent differentiation among 
developing countries based upon per capita income and trade participation.”
36 
  Thus, developed countries want the graduation of Special and Differential 
Treatment rules, since they resist providing the same treatment to advanced 
developing countries that they provide to poor developing countries and LDCs. This is 
due to the fact that they have a competitive relationship with advanced developing 
countries, as well as to the possibility that giving more beneficial treatment to them 
could cause an economic disadvantage to developed countries. 
Developing-country members do not accept the graduation of Special and 
Differential Treatment rules because it would mean that advanced developing 
countries would lose the full economic benefits of Special and Differential Treatment. 
Furthermore, for these countries, becoming developed members and losing the 
treatment that developing countries receive would mean serious damage to their 
economic relationships with developed-country members. In fact, advanced-
developing-country members hold a very important position in trade relationships, and 
are thus competitors for developed members. As a consequence, developed members 
demand equal treatment with emergent economic powers.  
On the other hand, poor developing countries and LDCs need, in some cases, the 
political influence of advanced developing countries, such as Brazil or India. With 
graduated treatment, advanced developing countries would lose their ability to be 
grouped with other developing economies in Doha´s negotiations.
37  
At any rate, from a pragmatic and realistic point of view, if developing-country 
members want to see the Special and Differential Treatment provisions reinforced, 
they should accept the definition and classification of the term developing country and 
consent to a graduation in Special and Differential Treatment implementation. In this 
way, India or Mexico would not be treated in the same way as Nicaragua or 
Cameroon, since they have different development needs.  
In other words, the survival of Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO’s 
future requires accepting a new Special and Differential Treatment understanding: a 
special and double differential treatment that could distinguish among developing-
country members, not only between the general category of developing countries and 
the subcategory of LDCs, but also within the general category of developing-country 
members according to their different levels of development.   A. Manero-Salvador 
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b. The Agreement–specific Proposals 
The lack of a tentative consensus about the three fundamental elements outlined above 
meant that Special and Differential Treatment negotiations were focused on the 88 
agreement-specific proposals tabled by developing-country members.  
The WTO General Council has classified these proposals into three categories: 
Category I – proposals on which it seems that it is likely that an agreement will 
be reached; 
Category II – proposals that are under negotiation in other WTO organs; and 
Category III – proposals on which it seems that it is not likely that an agreement 
will be reached. 
Since the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, the Trade and Development 
Committee has focused its attention on 16 proposals – 8 that fall into Category I and 8 
that fall into Category III. What happened to other the 72 proposals? As the committee 
notes, “of the 88 Agreement-specific proposals that had been tabled in the Special 
Session, … the Category II proposals had been referred to other negotiating and WTO 
bodies. That had left 50 Category I and III proposals under consideration in the 
Special Session. Before Hong Kong, Members had reached an in-principle agreement 
on 28 proposals …. This left 23 proposals, of which Members had, at Hong Kong, 
adopted five LDC proposals. This left 18 proposals pending for consideration in the 
Special Session, of which two related to the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
which had since expired.”
38 Thus, 16 proposals remained, 8 in Category I and another 
8 in Category III.  
Thus, the main advances have been realized in the Category I proposals and, to a 
lesser extent, in the Category III proposals.
39 Because of the frequent marginalization 
of the other WTO organs to which they were referred, the Category II proposals have 
received little attention.
40  
IV. Final Remarks 
he Doha Round’s mandate has not been accomplished yet, and it is necessary to 
urge members to conclude the negotiations. The Special and Differential 
Treatment mandate is one of the most controversial topics in the round, but, in order 
to overcome the underdevelopment issue, the WTO members should act as soon as 
possible to make Special and Differential Treatment provisions “more precise, 
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34.  See Communication from the United States of America. Special and differential 
treatment provisions monitoring mechanism. TN/CTD/W/19. Paragraph 4. 
       See also, Communication from the European Communities. The WTO work 
programme on special and differential treatment; some EU ideas for the way 
ahead. TN/CTD/W/20. Paragraph 15.e), and Communication from Switzerland to 
the CTD in Special Session. Special session on special and differential treatment. 
TN/CTD/W/14. Paragraphs 12 to 15. 
35.  Joint Communication from the African Group in the WTO. Monitoring 
mechanism for special and differential (S&D) treatment provisions. 
TN/CTD/W/23. Paragraphs 2 and 3. 
36.  Communication from Switzerland to the CTD in Special Session. Special Session 
on Special and Differential Treatment. TN/CTD/W/14. Paragraph 6. 
       See also Communication from the European Communities. Submission for the 
Committee on Trade and Development – Special Session on Special and 
Differential Treatment. TN/CTD/W/13, Paragraph 5, and Communication from 
the European Communities, The WTO Work Programme on Special and 
Differential Treatment, TN/CTD/W/26, Paragraph 6(a). 
37.  See Note on the Meetings of 7 and 18 October 2002. Committee on Trade and 
Development. Seventh Special Session. TN/CTD/M/7, Paragraph 78, and 
Communication from Paraguay, Organization of Work, TN/CTD/W/15, 
Paragraphs 10 and 11. 
38.  See Note on the Meeting of 6 March 2006. TN/CTD/M/23. Paragraph 7. 
39.  The negotiations dealing with Category III proposals began in June 2006. See 
Note on the Meetings of 1 June 2006. Committee on Trade and Development. 
TN/CDT/M/25. Paragraph 4. Currently there is not any hope of reaching a 
consensus. The chairman states: “Members were clearly far from finding a middle 
ground on Category III proposals.” (Paragraph 41). 
40.  See the lack of attention given to Ccategory II proposals in Note on the Meeting 
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